For a while now I’ve been ranting and raving to everyone that will listen about the gross failure of the HAMP (Home Affordable Modification Program) program and lenders’ inability and incompetence with regard to actually helping homeowners to stop foreclosure.
Over the duration of the last year and a half The Treasury Department has threatened, begged, cajoled, et. al. major lenders in hopes that they will finally stop using Making Home Affordable Trial Modifications as their own personal forbearance agreements, and actually grant loan modifications.
People are getting peeved, and Congress has now stepped in and found that of the original target of helping 3 – 4 million homeowners through HAMP, lender’s are going to fall very, very short at a measly 700,000 – 800,000 homeowners helped. So they’ve issued a big report and Treasury especially is in big trouble.
Wait lets back track a minute. How did we get in this predicament? And why is The Treasury Department in hot water? Let’s backtrack to the start of HAMP and take a look at what happened.
Banks are in big trouble and need money bad. They’ve sold the Country down the river in neat little packages marked “AAA” Rated Mortgage Backed Securities (supposedly as safe as Government Bonds), and now of course don’t trust each other enough to pass these overrated packages to each other so they’re no longer “liquid”. So Uncle Sam steps in to prevent a depression and cuts Wall Street a nice big check.
Thankfully that big check had a couple of strings attached, one being HAMP. HAMP = Making Home Affordable, a program designed to help deserving and needy homeowners to modify their loans and save their homes. The idea was HAMP was going to stop 3-4 million foreclosures and end the crisis, helping things get back to normal, and of course these grateful lender’s were going to participate.
I guess this is as good a place as any to note that HAMP in a nutshell = Submit documents, qualify, 3 month trial modification to make sure you can actually afford the payment, permanent modification. In that order and pretty straightforward, right?
Well, most major lenders didn’t (and still don’t) want to modify the majority of the loans in their portfolios because financially it didn’t (doesn’t) make sense. Maybe they purchased the loan from another failing bank at 10 – 20 cents on the dollar, maybe there’s equity in the home. Maybe they simply don’t trust delinquent borrowers to cough up that mortgage payment each month. Maybe money’s tight, lender’s aren’t as liquid as they’d like, and they’d rather loan money at prime rates to prime borrowers, rather than lower interest rates to 2-3% (or less) for homeowners that, prior to the mortgage crisis, would have been termed “sub-prime”. Maybe the lender’s “loss mitigation specialists” are underpaid, undertrained, or just plain lazy. Maybe your loan modification request was denied because your “negotiator” had a killer headache. Lot’s of maybes. Lot’s of reasons why lender’s don’t want to modify. So hardly anyone is getting into “Trial Modifications”.
So the Treasury Department and the Obama Administration call in these big banks for a meeting. And another meeting. And another meeting. And there’s a lot of talk and finger pointing and finally Treasury says “Ya know what, we’re gonna see more people in Trial Modifications, or else.”
The lenders are a little scared. What are they going to do? The investors that hold itty bitty portions of each mortgage backed security don’t want to agree to modify loans in accordance with HAMP guidelines, and the lender’s themselves already have enough “maybes” to not want to modify…
And then one of these itty bitty bankers got a very big idea. Why not place homeowners into the Trial Portion of the HAMP program, sucker them out of say 3 months, 6 months, heck why not an entire year’s worth of payments and then later cite exactly why they don’t qualify for a permanent modification if it doesn’t make sense for the lender to modify?
It’s funny how when a lender is 100% aware and sure they will lose money on a foreclosure they will bend over backwards to modify the loan, regardless of who the investor is, how much of a headache the negotiator may have (one particularly awful BofA “loss mitigation specialist”), or even whether it fits into HAMP guidelines (I’ve seen modifications of investment properties under HAMP?!).
And here we are almost present day. Well, Congress is a little peeved because lots of “constituents” – the people that voted for them like you and me are calling, calling, calling and complaining because they’re not getting permanent modifications. Finally Congress decides to do a little investigating.
Well, the sleuths over at Congress discover that neither Treasury or the Lenders have been doing their job (really mostly the lenders) but in order to avoid bad public opinion this Oversight Committee decides to particularly blast The Treasury Department:
While HAMP’s most dramatic shortcoming has been its poor results in preventing foreclosures, the program has other significant flaws. For example, despite repeated urgings from the Panel, Treasury has failed to collect and analyze data that would explain HAMP’s shortcomings, and it does not even have a way to collect data for many of HAMP’s add-on programs. Further, Treasury has refused to specify meaningful goals by which to measure HAMP’s progress, while the program’s sole initial goal – to prevent 3 to 4 million foreclosures – has been repeatedly redefined and watered down. Treasury has also failed to hold loan servicers accountable when they have repeatedly lost borrower paperwork or refused to perform loan modifications. Treasury has essentially outsourced the responsibility for overseeing servicers to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but both companies have critical business relationships with the very same servicers, calling into question their willingness to conduct stringent oversight. Freddie Mac in particular has hesitated to enforce some of its contractual rights related to the foreclosure process, arguing that doing so “may negatively impact our relationships with these seller/servicers, some of which are among our largest sources of mortgage loans.” Treasury bears the ultimate responsibility for preventing such conflicts of interest, and it should ensure that loan servicers are penalized when they fail to complete loan modifications appropriately. (View the full report here: http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121410-report.pdf)
Ok, so Congress has effectively placed the burden on Treasury. Reading through the Report they’ve also done their homework, hitting everything from the importance of free counseling for homeowners to targeting re-default rate so lender’s cant use it as much as a factor in denying modifications, and even looking more closely at what Treasury can and should be doing regarding holding Lenders as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac accountable for botched modification requests.
For the first time in a long time I’m beginning to think that maybe the Foreclosure Crisis is finally coming closer to an end. Call me cautiously optimistic.
I’m interested to hear your thoughts — Do you feel Treasury has dropped the ball? Should Congress have been taking a more proactive effort and if so at what time should they have targeted the HAMP program? Since inception? Have you been placed in a Trial Loan Modification only to be later rejected from getting a permanent modification (and did your loss mitigation specialist have a headache that day…)? I’d like to hear your story — so comment freely below!
December 16, 2010